Lausanne, 2 December 2017
На всякий случай копирую главу с выводами.
3 Conclusions by the IOC Disciplinary Commission
The IOC DC discussed and assessed all the information and elements, including oral witnesses, gathered during the 17 months of its activities. Due to the extreme gravity of the allegations, as well as the extent of this report, the IOC DC decided that the establishment of the facts and its subsequent conclusions should only be based upon documented, independent and impartial evidence.
From this analysis, the IOC DC drew two types of conclusions on the factual and the legal aspects.
3.1 Conclusions regarding the factual aspects
1) The analysis of the documented, independent and impartial elements, including those confidentially transmitted to the IOC DC, is corroborated by the forensic analysis performed by the ESC-LAD and the biological analysis carried by the CHUV. This enables the confirmation of the existence of the Disappearing Positive Methodology as well as a tampering methodology, in particular during the Olympic Winter Games Sochi 2014, as described in the Final Report by Prof. Richard McLaren.
The IOC DC confirms the seriousness of the facts, the unprecedented nature of the cheating scheme and, as a consequence, the exceptional damage to the integrity of the IOC, the Olympic Games and the entire Olympic Movement.
The Russian officials admitted wrongdoing by individuals within Russian institutions but never «State doping support system».
The IOC DC has not found any documented, independent and impartial evidence confirming the
support or the knowledge of this system by the highest State authority.
2) The results of the re-analysis of the previous Olympic Games samples from Beijing 2008 and London 2012 initiated by the IOC (on a total of 114 Anti-Doping Rule Violations (ADRV) for these two editions of the Olympic Games, 39 ADRV representing 34% affected Russian athletes), as well as the decisions already taken by the Denis Oswald DC regarding the samples from the Olympic Winter Games Sochi 2014, confirm a widespread culture of doping in Russia, affecting numerous sports for a long period of time.
However, the analysis of the objective evidence (especially the EDP) shows that the «almost 1 000» athletes named in the IP’s Reports did not all benefit from the DPM, as either they were not all marked as «Save» or, for some others, the evidence was insufficient to allow IFs’ disciplinary procedures, as confirmed by WADA. Furthermore, the results of the forensic and biological analysis, being from the UK Laboratory or the ESC-LAD / CHUV, were unable to establish that all the samples of the Russian athletes who participated to the Olympic Winter Games Sochi 2014, were tampered with.
3) The IOC DC also reviewed the findings of the IC Chaired by Mr Richard Pound, in the light of the documented objective elements mentioned above. This analysis demonstrates that these IOC Disciplinary Commission’s Report activities within the Russian sport organisations, with the support of the Moscow Laboratory, gave the opportunity to some of the actors to obtain a financial gain by encouraging the athletes to purchase the doping substances and, in case of positive tests results, to receive payment to conceal them.
4) While analysing various experts’ reports on the doping situation at the time of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) [Publication «Doping in der DDR», by Spitzer/Franke and «Sicherungsvorgang Sport» by Spitzer; discussion with Mr Roland Jahn, German journalist and a former Eastern Germany dissident who was appointed as Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Records in March 2011], the IOC DC sees some similarities but considers that the system in the former GDR was different from the one described in the IC and the IP’s Reports.
5) The IOC DC noted that the system progressed along with the evolution of the anti-doping technologies: initially the DPM was based on cheating in the reporting mechanism ADAMS, subsequently it escalated into a more elaborated method to report into ADAMS by creating false biological profiles; ending with the tampering of the samples by way of swapping «dirty» urine with «clean» urine. This required a methodology to open the BEREG-KIT® bottles, the constitution of a «clean urine bank» and a tampering methodology to reconstitute the gravity of the urine samples. This was confirmed by the results of the UNIL-ESC / CHUV forensic and biological analysis.
The IOC DC noted from oral witnesses that there was an evolution around 2011–2012: prior to this time, individual athletes were required to purchase doping products and/or to pay to cover-up their individual test results, when it seems that, as part of the scheme during the Olympic Winter Games Sochi 2014, the programme covered the costs of the manipulation of the doping tests.
6) Within this evolution of the system, the analysis of the evidence as well as the movie «Icarus», shows that Dr Grigory Rodchenkov played a key role. Due to his scientific abilities he was able to set-up detection methods to improve the fight against doping, to publish scientific articles and participate to experts’ observatory programmes, winning so a great international credibility. This enabled him on one hand, as an anti-doping expert, to gain access to the international expertise and strategy, in particular, during the Olympic Games London 2012, which helped him to contribute to the development of the specific system to be operational during the Olympic Winter Games Sochi 2014.
On the other hand, this knowledge allowed Dr Grigory Rodchenkov to design better doping products and protocols, ensuring that they would be less detectable and to establish a methodology to cover-up doping tests.
7) The detailed analysis of the e-mail exchanges attached to the IP Reports, (see above point 2.3) allows to confirm the involvement of a number of individuals within the Ministry of Sport and its subordinated entities, such as CSP, VNIIFK, RUSADA, Moscow and Sochi Laboratories. All the independent and impartial evidence as well as the results of the forensic and biological analysis confirm this conclusion.
8) Nevertheless, the independent and impartial evidence do not allow the IOC DC to establish with certitude either who initiated or who headed this scheme.
On many occasions, reference was made on the involvement at the Minister of Sport’s level, but no indication, independent or impartial evidence appeared to corroborate any involvement or knowledge at a higher level of the State.
This assertion is confirmed by Prof. Richard McLaren’s change of wording in his Final Report: in his Preliminary Report, he considered the existence of a «State-dictated failsafe system», including the activity of the Moscow Laboratory operating «under State directed oversight and control of its anti-doping operational system»; but, in his Final Report, he amended the wording to «An institutional conspiracy existed across summer and winter sports athletes who participated with Russian officials within the Ministry of Sport and its infrastructure, such as the RUSADA, CSP and the Moscow Laboratory, along with the FSB for the purposes of manipulating doping controls».
In addition to the above conclusions, the IOC DC considers that the various Russian institutions are considered to be administratively and/or legally responsible, as demonstrated in the second part of these conclusions.
3.2 Conclusions regarding the legal aspects
9) The Ministry of Sports, on behalf of the State, undertakes to ensure the respect of the international commitments of the State stated in the UNESCO International Convention Against Doping in Sport and thus to ensure that the WADA Code is implemented and respected by all the entities within the country, including at regional and local level.
The analysis of the documented, independent and impartial evidence, as explained above, demonstrates the failure to respect the WADA Code within the various entities under the responsibility of the Russian Ministry of Sport. As leading the Ministry of Sport, the then Russian Minister had the ultimate administrative responsibility for the acts perpetrated at the time within the Russian Ministry or the entities under its responsibility.
Furthermore, the analysis of the independent and impartial evidence shows the failure of the Ministry of Sport to respect the guarantees, which were given in December 2006 on behalf of the Government of the Russian Federation, regarding the respect of the WADA Code and the IOC Anti-Doping Rules during the Olympic Winter Games Sochi 2014.
10) The IOC DC notes that neither the IC’s nor the IP’s Reports mentioned the participation of the Russian Olympic Committee (ROC) in the system. No findings appeared during the IOC DC’s investigation to contradict these statements.
However, as explained above (see point 2.1.6), pursuant to the Olympic Charter (Rule 27.2), the ROC is responsible for promoting the fundamental principles and values of Olympism in Russia, including the implementation of the WADA Code. The ROC also decides upon the entry of the athletes participating in the Russian delegation at the Olympic Games (Paragraph 2.1 of Bye-law IOC Disciplinary Commission’s Report to Rules 27 and 28). During the Olympic Games, the Russian competitors, team officials and other team personnel of the ROC are placed under the responsibility of the ROC’s Chef de Mission (Paragraph 4 of Bye-law to Rules 27 and 28); they must respect and comply with the Olympic Charter and the WADA Code, which is mandatory for the whole Olympic Movement (Rules 40 and 43). The ROC is responsible for ensuring that the Russian competitors are fully aware and comply with the Olympic charter and the WADA Code (Paragraph 4 of Bye-law to Rule 44).
As a consequence, the ROC has to be held legally responsible for the failure to respect the Olympic Charter and the WADA Code by the Russian delegation during the Olympic Winter Games Sochi 2014.
Furthermore, by signing on 4 July 2007, the Host City Contract for the XXII Olympic Winter Games in 2014, the ROC undertook to fulfil the contractual obligations set-out in the HCC (see points 2.6 and 2.7 above). Particularly, pursuant to Article 24-b of the HCC, ROC was jointly and severally liable, with the SOCOG, to put in place a laboratory and to carry out doping controls in accordance with the provisions of the WADA Code.
The analysis of the documented, independent and impartial evidence, as explained above, demonstrates the failure by the ROC to ensure the respect the WADA Code during the Olympic Winter Games Sochi 2014 as well as its various legal obligations.
As a consequence, the ROC must be held legally responsible for the breach of its legal and contractual obligations.
11) The IOC DC noted that SOCOG has never been mentioned in the IP Reports regarding the scheme in place during the Olympic Winter Games Sochi 2014.
As explained above under point 2.1.7, SOCOG was responsible to enter into contract with a laboratory to be operational during the Olympic Winter Games Sochi 2014. The fact that the laboratory must be accredited by WADA does not affect the joint responsibility of SOCOG and the ROC to appoint a laboratory effectively respecting the ISL. The fact that SOCOG did not consider itself to be responsible for the operation of the Sochi Laboratory does not change the contractual responsibility of appointing a laboratory complying with the WADA Code.
The above analysis of the various objective and documented evidence, including the forensic and biological analysis, demonstrates the failure of the Sochi Laboratory to respect the ISL.
As SOCOG has been dissolved on 12 August 2014, the legal responsibility of this entity became obsolete on that date; however, the ROC has to take this responsibility as, pursuant to Article 24-b of the HCC, it was jointly and severally liable with SOCOG.
12) The IOC DC takes into consideration the expression of regret by the Russian authorities, in particular by the current Minister of Sport and by the President of the ROC, regarding the failure of the anti-doping system in Russia.
В сухом остатке:
не найдено ничего похожего на доказательства государственной поддержки допинговой системы;
Российское антидопинговое агентство и Олимпийский комитет Российской Федерации не смогли уследить за каким-то мошенником [конкретно — за бывшим руководителем Московской антидопинговой лаборатории Родченковым, но на этом комиссия предпочла не сосредоточиваться];
сплошная перепроверка в Лондоне допинг-проб российских спортсменов с нескольких олимпиад выявила несколько подозрительных пробирок [насколько я могу судить, при столь длительном — 5–10 лет — хранении вполне возможен распад многих больших органических молекул, присутствующих в нормальном организме, на части, сходные с продуктами подобного же распада некоторых искусственных больших органических молекул, изначально сходных с присутствующими в нормальном организме и вводимых ради воздействия на те же рецепторы, что и для нормальных молекул], но признаков массового применения допинга не выявлено;
аналогия с ГДР, где пару десятилетий разрабатывались фармакологические (в том числе и признанные впоследствии опасными для здоровья) методы повышения спортивных показателей, отсутствует.
Если я пропустил что-то существенное — укажите.
«Важным является то, что в выводах комиссии написано, что в России не было никакой системы государственной поддержки допинга. Это важное заключение. Но, если это так, тогда возникает вопрос: почему нашим олимпийцам запрещено выступать под российским флагом и российской символикой, если нет государственной поддержки? Наказывайте тогда тех, кто в этом виноват. А во-вторых, если нет господдержки допинга, то тогда почему им нельзя выступать под нашими национальными символами? Это, конечно, большой вопрос».